The regional distribution of public employment is affected by the role of public employment for inter-regional redistribution. We provide a theoretical framework that highlights the logic of such policies and analyze the empirical evidence. Our empirical study considers the regional distribution of public employment using regional data from 19 European countries. Using OLS as well as IV estimations, we find significant results that public employment is higher in regions that are poor relative to the national average. Moreover, the extent of such regional differences in public employment between high and low productivity regions can be related to other structural aspects of the economy.
Introduction
Anecdotal evidence suggests that public employment is responsible for substantial regional redistribution in some countries. Alesina et al (2001) , for example, illustrate for the case of Italy that regional redistribution through public employment from the richer Northern regions to the poorer Southern regions amounts to about half the public wage bill in the Southern regions. However, while such evidence for specific countries is suggestive, no comprehensive study of the determinants of the regional pattern of public employment from a cross-country perspective has been carried out to date. Moreover, the specific regional redistribution patterns observed in Italy and elsewhere have typically been explained by the particular nature of the specific political system and economic situation in the country under consideration. The present study considers more generally the role of public employment as an instrument for regional redistribution theoretically and provides an explicit regional, cross-country panel analysis of the regional pattern of public employment.
Public employment plays at least a double policy role. On the one hand, it increases the amount of public goods provided to citizens. On the other hand, it serves as an instrument to redistribute income across regions either directly through wage premia, or via its labor market effects. We start our analysis with a very simple framework that captures these two aspects. It provides a normative rationale for the use of public employment for inter-regional redistribution but can also be re-interpreted as a positive framework, for example, by an appropriate reformulation as a probabilistic voting model, that can explain, why governments use public employment for regional redistribution. The analysis shows that public employment can be a useful instrument for a benevolent government to redistribute from high productivity to low productivity regions, if redistribution via the tax-transfer system is constrained. Public employment should be higher in low productivity regions, if it contains a transfer component. Public employment is more costly in high productivity regions, since it crowds out more productive private sector jobs. Moreover, income transfers into such regions are not socially desirable given the lower marginal utility of income in such regions. The reverse holds true for public jobs in low income regions. Their opportunity costs are low and the additional transfer has a higher impact on welfare due to the higher marginal utility of consumption in low income regions. However, redistribution via public employment is inefficient, since it distorts optimal public goods provision. Consequently, redistribution is not complete in the sense that marginal utilities from private consumption will not be equalized across regions.
Our theoretical considerations are matched by our empirical analysis. Using an unbalanced panel of regional data from 19 European countries covering the time span from 1995-2006 we find significant and quantitatively important evidence that public employment is higher in low income regions vis-a-vis high income regions. These findings are robust to the choice of estimation techniques as well as to the detailed specification of the estimated equation.
Given the importance of public employment for policy-making and the various facets of the issue, it is not surprising that the theoretial and empirical literature on public emplyoment is substantial. However, to the best of our knowledge to date, there is hardly any consistent empirical evidence on its regional distribution. Existing empirical crosscountry studies of public employment, such as Rodrik (1998 Rodrik ( , 2000 , and Martínez-Vázquez and Ming-Hung (2009), among others, have considered only data at country level, so they do not, and can not, provide any evidence regarding the regional distribution of public employment. At the country level, a few studies have already considered the regional dimension of public employment. Besides the already mentioned contributions by Alesina et al. (2001) , Borge and Matsen (2004) consider empirically the role of public employment for risk sharing at the regional level. They show empirically for the case of Norway that public employment absorbs up to 25 % of private sector output shocks at the regional level. Finally, the studies by Alesina et al. (2000) and Mattos and França (2010) consider public employment at the municipal level in the US and Brazil, respectively. The concentration on individual country evidence in these studies can be justified by the better data availability and comparability at the country level. Here, however, we explicitly consider the cross-country dimension to detect the regularities regarding the pattern of regional distribution of public employment. Moreover, given that we build our panel dataset from consistent European data, we can explore the determinants of the regional distribution from such a comparative perspective.
Public employment has long been recognized by policy actors as an important policy area and a number of its key determinants have been analyzed.
1 While these contributions have typically been concerned with the level of public employment, their insights also have implications for its regional distribution that is the focus of our work. First, public employment is closely linked to the size of the government sector and the demand for goods and services typically produced by the government. Wagner's law maintains that the demand for these goods and services is highly income elastic. Similarly, Baumol's law maintains that productivity growth is lower in the public sector due to the nature of its products. These arguments suggest that public employment should increase with (regional) income.
Second, the importance of labor market interactions has been considered, among others by and Algan et al. (2002) . The latter authors have theoretically and empirically analyzed the relationship between public employment and unemployment at the country level. They find that public employment contributes to unemployment but also stress the importance of the degree of substitutability between the public goods and services provided with those of the private sector.
Third, public employment has been considered as a second best policy under several circumstances. Rodrik (1998 Rodrik ( , 2000 has argued, and provided empirical evidence, that public employment can be used by benevolent governments as an insurance device against otherwise unisurable risk. He argues that countries that are more open and more exposed to external shocks use public employment for this purpose. Similarly, Pirttilä and Tuomala (2005) , Lundholm and Wijkander (2008) and Poutvaara and Wagener (2008) , argue that, in settings with distortionary labour taxation, public employment can be used as a second best instrument to improve welfare.
Fourth, public employment has been considered from the perspective of political economy and bureaucracy theory. The political economy perspective typically regards public sector jobs as an instrument for politicians to channel rents to specific groups either to generate political support (Gelb et al. (1991) , López-de-Silanes et al. (1989) ), or to disguise the amount of transfers channelled to some favored minority group (Alesina et al. (2000) ). Similarly, the buraucracy perspective assigns an important role to bureaucrats' incentives for hiring, see among others, Kessing and Konrad (2008) who develop a theory of strategic hiring in the public sector.
As discussed, our theoretical analysis is cast in terms of a simple Utilitarian welfare maximization approach but can alternatively be interpreted as a political economy analysis of public employment policies. We do not take a strong view on these issues but are rather interested whether the theoretical predictions, however interpreted, are supported by the empirical evidence. The study is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out a simple theoretical framework. In section 3 we present our data and discuss our empirical strategy, while we present our results in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
A simple framework
Consider a country that consists of n regions i = 1, 2, ..., n of equal size. Each region's population is normalized to one, such that total population equals n. Individuals are immobile across regions and have the same preferences regarding the consumption of private goods x i and regional public goods g i given by
The regional public good g i is produced using regional public sector employment, m i , and we assume the simple production relationship g i = m i . Note that this implies that productivity in the public sector is the same across all regions. The price of the private consumption good is normalized to one. Regions differ in their private sector productivity reflected by inter-regional differences in private sector wages w i . We order regions by private sector productivity, such that w 1 ≥ w 2 ≥ ... ≥ w n . All individuals inelastically supply one unit of labor and private sector income is taxed at proportional rate t. Furthermore, individuals are employed either in the private sector (with probability 1 − m i ) or in the public sector (with probability m i ). Individuals working in the public sector earn an after tax wage w p . The public sector wage is the same across all regions corresponding to the empirical evidence of small regional variation of public sector wages. We choose to express public sector wages net of taxes for notational reasons, but none of our results depends on this assumption. Moreover, we assume w p > (1 − t) w i for all i. For simplicity, we assume risk neutral individuals and consider individuals' expected after tax income and private consumption given as
Alternatively, this may be interpreted as a shortcut to model the labor market effects of additional public sector labor demand on the wage level in a given region. There is only one level of government which is financed by the linear tax t which applies everywhere throughout the country. This reflects the fact that tax system are mostly uniform across regions with very little regional differentiation. The government budget constraint is
Using expected regional private consumption (2) and the government budget constraint (3), we can express regional utility as a function of the regional public employment levels
where m denotes the vector of public employment levels in the n regions. In all regions, utility is increasing in local public employment, because they benefit from additional local public good provision as well as from the income transfer, but they only have to contribute partly to its financing. Regional utility is decreasing in the level of public employment in other regions, since the region has to contribute to the financing, but does neither profit from additional public goods nor benefits from the income transfer.
Consider now the Utilitarian welfare maximization problem of a central government that determines the level of public employment in all regions given by
subject to (3). 3 Its solution is described by the first order conditions
where
is the increase in tax payments in region j in response to an increase of public employment in region i. 4 The left hand side of (6) are the marginal social benefits from an additional public sector worker in a region. This marginal benefit consists of the increase in expected income for private consumption, weighted by the marginal utility of private good consumption, plus the marginal utility of public good consumption. The right hand side is the sum of private consumption reductions in all regions caused by the necessary increase in taxation, weighted by the respective marginal utility of private consumption. From any two first order conditions (6) we can derive, for any two regions k and l, k = l, with w k > w l , 3 We could also allow for public sector wages w p to be determined endogenously. We take them as exogenously given, since we are primarily interested in the distribution of public sector employment. Note that we could also use a more general Utilitarian welfare function with different welfare weights 4 Tax revenues from region j are
. The change of tax revenues for all regions j = i is given by the change in the tax rate times the given tax base. For the region i, there is the additional effect of a reduction in the tax base, which is accounted for on the left hand side of (6) .
The optimal policy equalizes the marginal utilities from an additional public sector worker across all regions. The marginal utility of an additional public sector worker consists of the marginal increase in disposable income, given by the difference between public sector and private sector wages and valued at the marginal utility of private consumption, as well as of the marginal increase in public goods provision valued at the marginal utility of public goods consumption. From (7) we derive our first proposition.
Proposition 1
If for two regions k and l, k = l, w k > w l , the optimal policy requires m l > m k .
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Assume that m k > m l , and consider (7). Then, since w k > w l we must have for the expected net incomes of the regions k, x k > x l , and thus have u
The lower a region's income level, the higher will be its level of public employment. There are several reasons for this. First, the linear tax system may be regarded as an imperfect redistribution instrument, so public employment provides an additional channel for interregional redistribution. In fact, the differences in regional public sector wage premia imply that public goods provision will always be linked to a redistribution of income, so the optimal policy needs to take these effects into account. Public employment should be higher in low productivity regions since, compared to a high productivity region, additional public sector job in poorer regions has a higher marginal effect on welfare for two reasons. The marginal utility of private consumption is higher in these regions and the redistributive effect per job is higher due to lower private sector wages. Moreover, public employment is also relatively more costly in the high productivity regions, because higher productivity private sector jobs are crowded out, which has a stronger negative effect on private sector income and the government budget.
Note, however, that redistribution is incomplete. The condition (7) differs from the standard first-best redistribution result that asks for a complete equalization of the marginal utilties of private and public consumption. Public employment is a relatively inefficient instrument to redistribute across regions, since it requires a distortion of public goods provision. Thus, if more efficient instruments for regional redistribution exist, the role of public employment should be confined to efficient public goods provision. In particular, if the central government could differentiate its tax policy across regions and was not confined to pay the same wages across regions, such a policy could be used to reach the first best outcome of full equalisation of marginal utilities from private and public good consumption, without using different regional levels of public employment.
Several comments regarding the framework should be made. First, we take the restriction on alternative regional redistribution instruments as given. These restrictions could reflect constitutional or informational limitations for government policy. They have have been explicitly studied by Bordignon et al. (2001) and Persson and Tabellini (1996) , who also consider inter-regional redistribution, but do not consider the role of public employment. We believe that such considerations also play an important role in the context of public employment, but refrain from an explicit analysis here.
Second, with a view to the available regional data at the cross-country level that we use in our empirical analysis, we have abstracted from the role of regional and local governments. However, our framework may be re-interpreted as one in which the central government makes transfers to regional governments which use those transfers to provide public goods using public employment. In fact, since regional governments typically do not, or hardly, engage in their own tax-transfer policies, higher grants to poorer regions should be reflected in higher levels of public employment at the regional level.
Third, one may challenge the view that welfare maximization is the right benchmark to study the determination of the regional pattern of public employment. However, our theoretical benchmark can also be regarded as the outcome of electoral competition. In particular, given that the policy space is multi-dimensional, i.e., the policy needs to determine public employment in all regions, a probabilistic voting model would be a preferred way to describe the political competition. As is well-known, the outcome of such a model is the maximisation of a weighted Utilitarian welfare function, such that, if all regions carry equal weight, the outcome will be just as the one discussed here. More generally, there is a lot to be said for a more detailed look at the implications of particular institutional and political settings for the regional incidence of public employment. We explicitly choose to use a very simple and stylized general structure to detect general characteristics of the regional pattern of public employment from a cross-country perspective.
Data and empirical strategy
We build a panel data set of 170 regions from 19 European countries. All regional data is provided by Eurostat. Table A-1 gives an overview of the data and its sources (to be added). The data range from 1995 to 2006 but coverage varies by country such that our panel is unbalanced.
While the dataset provides consistent information on regional characteristics and public employment, there are also several challenges posed by the dataset. First, the regional public employment data we use excludes important parts of public employment in sectors such as education, research and health care. 5 However, since our focus is the regional distribution of public employment and not the overall size of the public sector, this does not pose a fundamental problem for our investigation. Moreover, this definition of public employment has the advantage that it is much easier to find available valid instruments for relative regional productivity levels to be used in IV estimations. Figure 1 presents some preliminary graphic evidence regarding our main hypothesis of a negative relationship between regional economic prosperity and the level of public employment. It plots the rate of deviation of regional GDP per capita from the country average versus the relative deviation of public employment per capita from the country average for the six biggest Economies in the EU in 2005. For all six countries this provides first evidence that public employment is actually higher in relatively poor regions on average.
Following this preliminary encouraging sketches, we turn to more elaborated investigation of our data. The basic equation we estimate is
where the dependent variable pse ijt is per capita public employment in region i in country j at time t. and either k = i or k = j. Our main variable of interest on the right hand side is the variable rgdp ijt , the ratio of regional GDP per capita to the national average GDP per capita, such that β 2 is our main coefficient of interest. We further use a number of regional level (Ctrl ijt ) and country level (Ctrl jt ) controls. At the regional level, we use population density, the dependency ratio (measured as the population below 15 and above 64 divided by the population between 15 and 64), and the relative regional public sector wage. At country level we use country level GDP per capita and relative public sector wages. Moreover, we employ time fixed effects in all regressions, and country or region fixed effects, respectively. Finally, we decided to drop all regions which are home to the seat of government of the countries in our sample. The importance of the seat of government typically implies that these regions have much higher levels of public employment per capita, in particular given our somewhat narrow definition of public employment, which makes them natural outliers.
The level of regional GDP is likely not to be exogenous, but could endogenously be determined by the level of public employment. On the one hand, increased public employment may provide important inputs that increase private sector productivity. On the other hand, the most productive individuals may be attracted by the public sector and the entrepreneurial talents could be absorbed by the relatively high attraction of the public sector with a negative effect on private sector productivity. Accordingly, we also provide IV estimations. We use the per capita number of patent applications and the per capita business sector spending on research and development (both relative to the country average) as instruments for regional GDP. Both instrument prove highly significant in the auxiliary regression and can be regarded as exogenous given that our measure of public employment does not comprise public employees in education and research.
Results
Our results are presented in Table 1 . Both, the estimation with country fixed effects (Column 1), as well as with regional effects (Column 2) find strong evidence for higher public employment in regions that are characterized by lower GDP per capita. The estimates are highly significant and quantitatively important. A reduction of a region's relative GDP per capita with respect to the country average implies that regional public employment per 100 inhabitants to be higher by . 16 -.19 . Given an average of 3.14 public employees per 100 inhabitants this is not negligible.
The significance of the other variable is mixed. The average GDP at country level enters with a positive sign, which can be seen as in line with Baumol's law. The dependency ratio is not significant without the region fixed effects, but is highly significant in the region fixed effects estimation. The opposite holds true for regional population density. Finally, the relative public sector wage at the regional level (relative to the country average) is significant and enters negatively, whereas the relative public sector wage level at country level is insignificant. The former finding indicates that our theoretical framework may be somewhat too simplistic. Given our assumption of fixed uniform public sector wages, Notes: i) * * * -significant at 1% level, * * -significant at 5% level, * -significant at 10% level; ii) The IV estimation of Column 3 uses regional patent applications per capita and business sector spending on R&D per capita (both relative to the country average) as exogenous instruments for relative regional GDP per capita. Column 4 only uses regional patent applications per capita as an additional instrument. iii) Robust standard errors in parantheses iv) Standard errors clustered by regions. relative productivity and relative wage premia always run parallel, so the differential finding cannot be captured by our simple model. This could, however, be accomplished by extending the model appropriately.
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Table 1 also provides the results of two IV estimations. Column 3 presents the IV results where per capita applications and per capita spending on research and development have been used as additional instruments, whereas column 4 presents the results of an IV estimation that uses only patent applications as an additional instrument. This estimation was carried out because the lack of availability of the data on R&D spending reduces the number of observations significantly and systematically, so we want to be sure that the results are sufficiently robust.
The IV estimations support the earlier findings that regions with low GDP per capita with respect to the country average have higher levels of public employment per capita. The coefficients of interest are actually higher in the IV estimations, indicating a quantitative more important role to regional productivity differences for the differences in regional public employment levels.
Summary and conclusion
In contrast to most of the existing literature, the present analysis has concentrated on the regional distribution of public employment and not on its level. We argue that governments can use public employment for inter-regional redistribution, since public employment, although nationally financed, can increase public good supply in targeted regions and can generate inter-regional income transfers. Within a simple welfare maximization framework such redistribution can improve welfare, if the government's use of more efficient instruments is constrained. Public employment levels should differ between high and low productivity regions because the income transfer related to an additional public sector job is higher in low productivity regions as well as the marginal utility of private consumption is higher in these regions. Alternatively, this may be rephrased by saying that crowding out private sector jobs in more productive regions has higher opportunity costs to society. Our theoretical analysis may alternatively be cast in terms of a probabilistic voting model and can accordingly be interpreted as a positive analysis of the determinants of the regional distribution of public employment.
Our empirical analysis of an extensive panel dataset of 170 regions from 19 European countries provides evidence that public employment actually follows such a pattern of regional distribution. Public employment is significantly higher in low productivity regions. These findings are robust to a number of specifications, including basic OLS with country fixed effects, regional (panel) fixed effects estimations, and instrumental variables estimations.
Due to data limitations our analysis cannot provide a comprehensive analysis of all determinants of the regional distribution of public employment. Clearly, the interaction between different levels of government, the political institutions, and the role of the public sector in other sectors, not covered in our data set, are further important determinants of the regional pattern of public employment. Nevertheless, we provide a very stylized framework that can provide a rationale for an uneven distribution of public employment across regions. Further research may investigate further how the relationship between regional productivity imbalances and public employment is determined by structural characteristics of the countries under consideration.
